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Abstract
This review provides a critical appraisal of Kubow and Min’s paper. It teases out their conception 
of liberalism and argues that the classical notion of liberalism as a political theory that advocates indi-
vidual liberty based on assumptions of the unencumbered autonomous individual has lost currency. 
This is because over the years liberalism has mutated into a multiplicity of new forms, and there is no 
single view that can be said to define what it means to be a liberal. The paper raises methodological 
questions with respect to the use of focus group interviews. It implores researchers to first ask them-
selves whether they can tell what a person really believes on the basis of a few questions put to him in 
an interview.
This article is in response to
Kubow, P. K. & Min, M. (2016). The Cultural Contours of Democracy: Indigenous Epistemologies 
Informing South African Citizenship. Democracy and Education, 24(2), Article 5. Available at: http://
democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol24/iss2/5
This paper serves as a review article of Kubow and Min’s (2016) paper, “The Cultural Contours of Democracy: Indigenous Epistemologies Informing 
South African Citizenship.” Kubow and Min examined the 
epistemic orientations toward individual- society relations that 
inform democratic citizenship and identity in South Africa. They 
drew on the concept of Ubuntu as their main theoretical lens to 
“examine the ways in which South African schoolteachers in a 
township outside Cape Town’s city center view democracy and the 
role of formal schools in educating for democracy” (Kubow & Min, 
2016, p. 1). Kubow and Min argued that the “public- private episte-
mological binary stems from a liberal tradition that envisions 
society as affording individuals opportunities to fulfil their goals 
through individual freedom, property ownership, and privatization 
with minimal governmental interference” (Kubow & Min, 2016, p. 2). 
The link among Ubuntu, education, liberalism, democracy, and 
citizenship in South Africa cannot be overemphasized (Enslin & 
Horsthemke, 2004; Nkondo, 2007; Waghid & Davids, 2014; Waghid 
& Smeyers, 2012). South Africa has only recently just emerged from 
a sordid history of apartheid, which was marked by an ideology of 
racial discrimination, segregation, institutionalized privileging  
of the minority White populations, and institutionalized exclusion 
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of the majority African peoples from all forms of opportunity.  
In 1996 South Africa adopted a constitution that has been hailed 
worldwide as “a model liberal democratic constitution that has few 
peers in the world community” (Jordan, 1996) and that bears “the 
hallmarks of liberal democracy” (Dugard, 1998, p. 23; Enslin & 
Horsthemke, 2004, p. 552). Moreover, the constitution “is widely 
hailed as liberal and egalitarian” (Deveaux, 2003, p. 162) because  
“it values human dignity and frames human rights at its heart” 
(Robinson, 2012, p. 2).
In this review article, I provide a critical appraisal of Kubow 
and Min’s (2016) paper. I start with an appraisal of Kubow and 
Min’s contribution to the debate on Ubuntu. But I also highlight 
absence of the literature that has defined the contours of scholar-
ship in Ubuntu and added to our understanding of the concept 
(Keevy, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Letseka, 2000; Louw, 2001, 2006; 
Mokgoro, 1998; Ramose, 1999, 2002a, 2002b; Teffo, 1994; Waghid, 
2014a, 2014b; Waghid & Davids, 2014; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012). 
Second, I tease out Kubow and Min’s conception of liberalism, 
which, I argue, is premised on classical notions of liberalism that 
view the individual as an unencumbered autonomous self. I shall 
argue that this view of liberalism has lost currency. Over the years, 
mainly due to the unintended consequences of colonialism and 
imperialism, liberalism has mutated into new forms such that there 
is no single view that can be said to define what it means to be a 
liberal. Rather, there are “many liberalisms” (Rawls, 1996, p. 223),  
“a multitude of liberalisms” (McKay, 2000, p. 627), and “a family of 
liberalisms” (Simhony, 2003, p. 283). Lumumba- Kasongo (2005) 
argued that liberalism “is not the monopoly of Western society as 
struggles outside the West have shaped its content and contributed 
to its redefinition” (p. 7). Third, I touch on Kubow and Min’s 
research methodology. I shall argue that there is a taken- for- 
granted assumption that data derived from focus group interviews 
is valid and/or conclusive and that there is therefore no need for 
any further methodological justifications. But as Kidd & Parshall 
(2000) cautioned, “individuals in groups do not speak or answer 
questions in the same way that they do in other settings” (p. 294). 
In the same vein, Merton (1987) pointed out that focus- group 
research gets misused for quick- and- easy claims about the validity 
of the research while treating plausible interpretations deriving 
from qualitative group interviews “as though they had been shown 
to be reliably valid for gauging the distributions of response” (p. 557). 
In the fourth and final section, I provide concluding remarks.
Appraisal of Kubow and Min’s Paper
In this section I offer a brief appraisal of Kubow and Min’s (2016) 
paper. I shall highlight areas in their contribution to the debate on 
Ubuntu that I think are commendable. For instance, their acknowl-
edgement of Ubuntu’s feature of African communal interdepen-
dence, as well as their rich and detailed use of verbatim expressions 
of their interview respondents. But I shall also show that their 
paper has serious shortcomings that warrant critical responses. To 
start with, Kubow and Min’s contribution to the debate on Ubuntu 
in South Africa is timely and welcome. South Africans continue to 
grapple with the challenges of a new and emergent society that was 
forged through a tense and protracted process of political 
negotiations by diverse parties that were, at the time at war with 
each other. On the one hand, to the majority of the historically 
marginalized African peoples, the negotiation process, known at 
the time as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) held hope for the creation of a new nation that would 
be marked by non- racism, non- discrimination, and non- sexism. 
Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu called this new nation the 
Rainbow Nation. Herman (2011) wrote that the notion of Rainbow 
Nation envisioned a new nation marked by “peace, harmony and 
the co- existence of all citizens” (p. 1). On the other hand, to the 
historically privileged White minority populations, especially the 
Afrikaners, CODESA symbolized political, cultural, and economic 
capitulation and doom. The negotiations marked capitulation by 
the then ruling Afrikaner Nationalist Party to Black radical 
liberation struggle movements that were feared and perceived as 
communists and swart gevaar (Afrikaans word for “Black dan-
ger”). The liberation struggle movements that fought for the 
eradication of apartheid— the African National Congress (ANC), 
the Pan African Congress (PAC), the South African Communist 
Party (SACP), the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO), and 
the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), to mention a few— 
were all lumped together by the minority Afrikaners as terrorist 
and communist organizations. This was not unusual, given that 
apartheid ideology was anti- Black and anti- communist. Indeed, in 
1950 the then apartheid regime passed the Suppression of 
Communism Act. The act outlawed “the Communist Party and 
used a very broad definition of communism (any attempt ‘at 
bringing about political, industrial, social or economic change 
within the union by promotion of disturbance or disorder’) and to 
declare other organizations that opposed government policies 
unlawful” (Durkheim, Mtose, & Brown, 2011, p. 5). Thus, to most 
Afrikaners, CODESA represented the Afrikaner National Party’s 
capitulation to terrorist and communist organizations.
Post- apartheid South Africa has been described as a “Two 
Nations” (Mbeki, 1998). On the one hand is the majority Africans, 
who are underprivileged and poor and live under conditions of a 
grossly underdeveloped economy. This section of society hoped 
that CODESA would give birth to a new and better nation in which 
peoples’ fundamental human rights and freedoms would be 
enshrined in a constitution that strives for a non- racist, non- 
discriminative, and non- sexist society. On the other hand is the 
minority Whites, who had access to a developed economy and 
enjoyed relative prosperity. This section of society feared that the 
country would slide into a bloodbath orchestrated by perceived 
ruthless terrorists and communists who would only be delighted to 
erode all forms of White privilege. During the hearings of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Anglican Arch-
bishop Desmond Tutu, chairperson of the commission, implored 
all those who came to testify to embrace the philosophy of Ubuntu, 
which is grounded on forgiveness and respect for human dignity. 
In his book, No Future without Forgiveness, Tutu (1999) wrote:
A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of 
others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or 
she has proper self- assurance that comes from knowing that he or she 
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belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated 
or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if 
they were less than who they are. (p. 35)
This brief exposition is necessary in that it links Ubuntu in 
South Africa with proceedings of the TRC. To their credit, Kubow 
and Min (2016) acknowledged this in their reference to Bishop 
Tutu’s assertion that “an individual is not simply an independent, 
solitary entity in the African worldview, but ‘human precisely in 
being enveloped in [the] community of other human beings,  
in being caught up in the bundle of life’” (p. 2). They wrote that 
Ubuntu signifies a process or state of perpetual becoming, and that 
it denotes a being that is in a continuous process of becoming. 
Kubow and Min equated Ubuntu with humanity or humanness, as 
captured in the Nguni proverb umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, whose 
English translation approximates “a person is a person through 
other persons.” Thus, for Kubow and Min, individuals are not 
created by or from themselves, nor do they exist for their own 
selves. Rather, men and women come from and exist within a social 
network— a community. This view confirms a crucial aspect of 
Ubuntu, namely the notion of African communal interdependence. 
African communal interdependence finds expression in the African 
conception of the family, as the extended family, and can be found 
in the writings of several African scholars and philosophers in 
Southern and Eastern Africa. For instance, Kenyan theologian and 
philosopher John S. Mbiti, who is regarded by many as one of the 
pioneers of African philosophy, coined the maxim “I am, because 
we are; and since we are, therefore I am.” Verhoef and Michel (1997) 
argued that the “we” of the African ethos “is a shared experience,  
a body of collective experience, an understanding that one’s 
experiences are never entirely one’s own” (p. 396). In his seminal 
book, African Religions and Philosophy, Mbiti (1989) posited that in 
Africa, “the individual cannot exist alone except corporately. She 
owes her existence to other people, including those of past genera-
tions and her contemporaries” (p. 106). Concomitantly, “whatever 
happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and 
whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual” 
(Mbiti, 1989, p. 106). In the same vein, commenting on the Kikuyu 
peoples’ way of life, former Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta (1965) 
wrote that “according to Kikuyu ways of thinking, nobody is an 
isolated individual. Rather, their uniqueness is a secondary fact 
about them; first and foremost they are several people’s relatives 
and several people’s contemporaries. People are closely intercon-
nected with one another in a lifestyle oriented to the other” (p. 296).
Regarding the family Lauras- Lecoh (1990) contended that 
“worldwide Africa is seen as one of the sanctuaries of the extended 
family. It is the continent where the nuclear family, reduced to a 
couple and their offspring, is still a rarity” (p. 480). For Ayisi (1992, 
p.16), the extended family forms the raison d’être of all social 
cooperation and responsibility. Mbiti’s (1975, p. 176) view is that the 
extended family is a microcosm of the wider society. It embodies a 
broad spectrum of personal associations among great- 
grandparents, grandparents, fathers, mothers, uncles, aunts, 
children (sisters, brothers, cousins, nephews, and nieces), a host of 
maternal and paternal relatives, as well as the departed members. 
For Gyekye (1997), “one outstanding cultural value of the tradi-
tional African society that is a feature of ever- present consciousness 
of ties of kinship is the emphasis on the importance of the family— 
the extended family” (pp. 292– 293). Thus, in African cultures, the 
extended family can be regarded as the medium for the concrete 
and spontaneous expression of communal values such as love, 
caring, cohesion, solidarity, interdependence, mutual sympathy, 
responsibility, and helpfulness.
One of the shortcomings of Kubow and Min’s (2016) paper is 
the absence of key role players in the discourse of Ubuntu. 
However hard and repeatedly I read through the paper, I couldn’t 
help noticing that there is no reference to some of the most 
influential scholars on Ubuntu in Southern Africa. These are 
scholars who have defined the contours of scholarship on Ubuntu 
and contributed to our understanding of debates on the concept 
(Keevy, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Louw, 2001, 2006; Mokgoro, 1998; 
Ramose, 1999, 2002a, 2002b; Teffo, 1994; Waghid, 2014a, 2014b; 
Waghid & Davids, 2014; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012). If I were to 
single out a few from the above list, it would no doubt be Ramose’s 
(1999) book African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Teffo’s (1994) The 
Concept of Ubuntu as a Cohesive Moral Value, and Waghid’s (2014) 
African Philosophy of Education Reconsidered: On Being Human. 
These are some of the landmark works on Ubuntu that anyone 
writing about the concept can ill afford to omit from the literature.
Finally, there is a sense that Kubow and Min’s (2016) take on 
Ubuntu might be viewed as reductionist in that it appears to 
reduce Ubuntu to a South African context instead of viewing it as 
an ancient African worldview. Ubuntu has a much wider import to 
Southern and East Africa than Kubow and Min made it out to 
look. For instance, among the Bantu language speakers of South-
ern Africa, from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South 
Africa, Swaziland, to Zambia and Zimbabwe, Ubuntu is variously 
referred. As Tambulasi & Kayuni (2005, p. 148) pointed out, in the 
Chewa language of Zambia, Ubuntu is known as Umunthu; among 
the Yao speakers of Malawi, it is known as Umundu; among the 
Tsonga peoples in South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and 
Swaziland, it is known as Bunhu; among the Shona- speaking 
peoples of Zimbabwe, it is Unhu; among the Sotho- speaking 
peoples of Lesotho, Botswana, and South Africa, Ubuntu it is 
known as Botho; and among the Venda speakers of South Africa, it 
is known as Vhutu. Among the Nguni- speaking peoples of South 
Africa— Xhosas, Zulus, Ndebeles, and Ngwanes— it is known as 
Ubuntu, while among the Swazis of Swaziland, it is known as 
Buntfu.
Kubow and Min’s Views on Liberalism
I should hasten to mention that Kubow and Min (2016) only 
mentioned the word liberal once in their paper. Nonetheless, that 
single occasion is crucial in that it speaks to perceptions of creation 
of citizens (Callan, 1997). Kubow and Min drew on Cohen’s (1982) 
book Four Systems to argue that
in the West, the concept of citizen is associated with the public realm 
and the individual with that of the private sphere. This public- private 
epistemological binary stems from a liberal tradition that envisions 
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society as affording individuals opportunities to fulfill their goals 
through individual freedom, property ownership, and privatization 
with minimal governmental interference. (Kubow & Min, 2016, p. 2)
However, this view of liberalism as purely individualist and 
unencumbered is outdated in that it ignores the simple fact that 
due to colonial conquest and the spectra of imperialism the notion 
of liberalism has mutated and undergone transformation and 
indigenization. As a result, it is no longer plausible to speak of 
liberalism as if the concept has been frozen in time and space to 
retain its classical Western connotations. As Ware (1992) reminded 
us, “the ‘exporting’ of liberal democracy to ex- colonies or to 
regimes which were conquered militarily, but which had no 
previous history of liberal democracy (such as Japan), transforms 
liberal democracy” (p. 140). It is Ware’s (1992) contention that 
“there are today quite distinct types of liberal democracy” (p. 137). 
The literature shows that a country like Japan is a useful example of 
a non- Western liberal democracy that has successfully imported 
external Western cultures and indigenized them to suit the needs 
and aspirations of the Japanese people (Fukuyama, 1992; Hunting-
ton, 1993, 1996). Commenting on the specific case of South Africa, 
Enslin (1999) pointed out that “the new democratic order in South 
Africa and its education system presuppose some central distin-
guishing features of liberalism” (p. 175). It is therefore unsurprising 
that some contemporary liberal theorists now acknowledge that 
there exists “a family of liberalisms” (Simhony, 2003, p. 283),  
“a multitude of liberalisms” (McKay, 2000, p. 627), and “many 
liberalisms” (Rawls, 1996, p. 223).
An Ubuntu- oriented view of liberalism would therefore be 
one that recognizes individual rights, but within the framework 
and guiding principles of a community. There is tacit knowl-
edge among some liberal theorists that “liberalism is itself a 
form of community” (Galston, 1991, p. 43), in which members 
“excel in liberal virtues and as a consequence, flourish in a 
distinctively liberal way” (Macedo, 1991, p. 278). Other liberal 
theorists have suggested that “liberalism supplies the best 
interpretation of a political community” (Dworkin, 1989, p. 
480); that “the lives of individual people and that of their 
community are integrated” (Dworkin, 1989 p. 491); and that 
“the critical success of any one of their lives is an aspect of, and 
so is dependent on the goodness of the community as a whole” 
(Dworkin, 1989 p. 491). Thus, “the inseparability of rights and 
community is a consistent liberal position” (Simhony, 2003,  
p. 271). Abbey and Taylor (1996, p. 3) contended that “it is 
possible for someone to have communitarian or holist ontology 
and to value liberalism’s individual rights.” In my view, Mulhall 
(1987) was spot- on in his observation that the liberal “need have 
no difficulty in accepting the constitutive role of community 
membership” (p. 275). He argued that “liberals must indeed 
affirm that the political community’s institutions embody a 
vision relating to personhood, that is, they must affirm that such 
institutions protect that capacity which makes an individual 
citizen a human agent and so refer to a capacity which every 
citizen is supposed to possess if he is to be seen as a person at 
all” (Mulhall, 1987, p. 275).
Kubow and Min’s Research  
Methodological Shortcoming
Kubow and Min’s (2016) paper is based on a qualitative study 
involving focus group interviews of 50 Xhosa teachers at 7 primary 
and intermediate schools on the outskirts of Cape Town in the 
Western Cape Province, South Africa. In total, their sample 
comprised 34 females and 16 males. Kubow and Min told us:
The lead author conducted focus group interviews at the schools, 
which ranged in length from 45 to 75 minutes. The interviews were 
audio recorded and then transcribed verbatim. The resultant 
empirical data, combined with a review of scholarship regarding 
ubuntu and democracy, constitute the main sources of evidence for 
this case study. (2016, p. 5)
Kubow and Min explained that the participants comprised a 
mixed bag of relatively inexperienced (two months) teachers to 
highly seasoned teachers with 30 years of teaching experience. 
When Kubow and Min’s sample is disaggregated by age, the 
participants’ ages ranged between 20 and 69 years. There seems to 
be an implicit presumption in Kubow and Min’s paper that merely 
stating that “focus group interviews with 50 Xhosa teachers from 
all seven primary and intermediate schools” (Kubow and Min, 
2014, p. 3) were conducted is sufficient justification of the reliabil-
ity of the data obtained, and by extension sufficient justification 
for the inferences thereof which the authors made. Hammersley 
(2003) called this “the ‘romantic impulse’ which treats open- 
ended interviews as capturing the ‘genuine voices’ of interview-
ees” (p. 119). In the 1950s, Dean and Whyte (1958) asked a simple 
question: “How do you know if the informant is telling the truth?” 
They noted that “those who ask the question seem bothered by the 
insight that people sometimes say things for public consumption 
that they would not say in private. And sometimes they behave in 
ways that seem to contradict or cast serious doubt on what they 
profess in open conversation. So the problem arises: Can you tell 
what a person really believes on the basis of a few questions put to 
him in an interview” (p. 34)? Crucially, Dean & Whyte cautioned 
that “the informant’s statement represents merely the perception 
of the informant, filtered and modified by his cognitive and 
emotional reactions and reported through his personal verbal 
usages” (Dean & Whyte, 1958, p. 34). From this analysis, they 
argued that the interview merely yields “the informant’s picture of 
the world as he sees it. And we are getting it only as he is willing to 
pass it on to us in this particular interview situation” (Dean & 
Whyte, 1958, p. 34).
Lunt (1996) warned that the decisions and rationale behind 
the use of interviews “often remain implicit with the research 
presenting the findings as if no choices had been made beyond that 
of using focus groups in the first place” (p. 80). In the case of 
Kubow and Min’s paper, their data is further complicated by the 
seeming imbalance between female and male respondents. For 
instance, the fact that female respondents (34) are more than 
double the number of male respondents (16) is neither problema-
tized nor unpacked further. Instead, it is taken as a given or a 
self- explanatory research methodological phenomenon. It is a 
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serious methodological flaw on Kubow and Min’s part that the 
potential for their data to statistically privilege female voices over 
male voices in the articulation of the cultural contours of democ-
racy is neither unpacked nor probed. Finally, the question whether 
interviewing 50 teachers in a township with a population of 50,000 
is representative justification of “the cultural contours of democ-
racy” in that township is left to the reader’s imagination. In cases 
like these, a footnote declaring that the findings of the study should 
not be regarded as sufficient to generalize on the nexus between 
Ubuntu and democratic citizenship in Cape Town in particular, 
and in South Africa in general, would have sufficed.
Conclusion
What I have attempted to in this review article is to provide a 
critical appraisal of Kubow and Min’s (2016) paper “The Cultural 
Contours of Democracy: Indigenous Epistemologies Informing 
South African Citizenship.” I acknowledged the value- added 
contribution of Kubow and Min’s paper to the debate on Ubuntu 
and education for democratic citizenship in South Africa. I 
showed that South Africa has only just emerged from a sordid 
history of racial discrimination, segregation, institutionalized 
privileging of the minority White populations, and systematic 
exclusion of the majority of the African peoples from all forms of 
opportunity. Post- apartheid South Africa is still grappling with 
the challenges of managing the gains of the 1994 democratic 
processes that were forged through political negotiations between 
opposition parties that were at war with each other. Attaining 
democratic citizenship in this fragile sociopolitical and cultural 
environment requires a new mindset that is imbued with Ubuntu 
moral values and principles. I commended Kubow and Min’s 
paper as a timely and welcome contribution to the debate on 
Ubuntu. But I also demarcated the paper’s weaknesses, which I 
argued call for critical responses. For instance, I showed that the 
paper is thin on the important literature that defined the contours 
of scholarship on Ubuntu and contributed to our understanding 
of the concept. Methodologically, I highlighted Kubow and Min’s 
uncritical dependence on focus group interviews. I pointed out 
that during interviews, informants’ statements merely represent 
their perceptions, which are filtered and modified by the infor-
mants’ cognitive and emotional reactions and reported through 
their personal verbal usages. I raised questions of validity in terms 
of whether statements made by 50 teachers during focus group 
interviews can be regarded as representative of views of 50,000 
residents of the township in which the study was conducted. I 
suggested this could have simply been remedied by a footnote 
declaring that the findings of the study should not be regarded as 
generalizable.
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